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Abstract
Market power often emerges in wholesale electricity markets. Regulators use several
strategies to limit market power: adopting bidding rules, compulsory forward markets
and enhancing demand response. We study the case of the Irish Single Electricity Market
(SEM), where the market will eliminate strict bidding rules to comply with the European
Target Electricity Model. Using the PLEXOS unit-commitment model, we simulate the
price that emerges in Cournot competition and find that it is more than 60% higher than
in perfect competition. We then study how much the price varies with three measures
that influence market power. Limiting thermal generators’ ownership of wind generation
does not affect prices. Forcing the largest firm to sell some of its output forward decreases
prices, but keeps them well above competitive levels. The most effective measure is an
increase in price elasticity of demand, although existing evidence shows that it is hard to
achieve. We conclude that regulatory oversight of bids will have to continue, although the
Target Model will be associated with limited transparency, creating further challenges.
Keywords: regulation; oligopoly; wind generation; forward contracts; demand re-
sponse.
JEL classification: L1; L9.
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1 Introduction
Wholesale electricity markets often have a small number of large generators, a feature that
facilitates market power. Market power is likely in electricity markets due to the lack of
economic storage, limitations to the amount of electricity that can flow along transmission and
distribution lines, high capital costs of new generation and the limited reaction of electricity
demand to price changes. Regulatory authorities confront the issue of how to mitigate market
power under these conditions.
Power market regulators in the European Union (EU) have to comply with several con-
straints associated with EU policy and its move towards an integrated EU electricity market,
known as the Target Model.1 While the Target Model does not dictate the design of each
jurisdiction’s power market, it facilitates the adoption of a market design based on bilateral
trading and self dispatch. Borggrefe and Neuhoff (2011) argue that bilateral trading with self
dispatch limits the ability of regulators to monitor participants’ bids and behaviour.
Regulators that cannot monitor participants’ bids can still access other tools. Com-
mon market power mitigation tools include forward contract commitments for the output
of the largest generators, behavioural rules (Joskow, 2008), or enhanced demand response
(Borenstein and Bushnell, 1999). Lazar (2014) suggests that only a combination of tools will
maintain a reliable and affordable electricity system, especially in the face of the increased
penetration of unpredictable renewable electricity generation, which many EU markets are
experiencing. In this paper we focus on the impact of short to medium term measures. The
impact of forward contract commitments, changes in wind ownership and in demand response
on the equilibrium wholesale electricity price. We do not include the effect of interconnection
in this paper. Increases in interconnection are long-term solutions to market power problems.
Malaguzzi Valeri (2009) showed that it would take high increases in interconnection capacity
to significantly decrease market power in the SEM, assuming an efficient operation of the
interconnector.
We take the Single Electricity Market (SEM) of Ireland and Northern Ireland as a test case
and simulate market prices with the integrated electricity model PLEXOS,2 which allows us to
model strategic behaviour by generating companies. The SEM has several characteristics that
are useful for our study. It is currently fully transparent with clear bidding rules designed
1The EU Third Energy Package created the regulatory framework underlying the shift to an EU-wide
integrated electricity system.
2Available online at www.energyexemplar.com
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to limit market power. Its transparency gives us access to information on the technical
characteristics of all the plants including their heat rate curve, or the amount of fuel needed
for each level of electricity generated. The SEM has limited interconnection to neighboring
jurisdictions, allowing us to isolate the effect of changes in bidding strategies, forward markets
and demand response more easily. Finally, it has a relatively large penetration of wind
generation.
We simulate what would happen if all bidding rules were lifted, taking 2011 as the bench-
mark year. We find that, first, lifting all bidding rules leads to an increase in market power
and increased prices, as expected. Second, we identify the theoretical effect of wind gener-
ation ownership on equilibrium prices, finding that ownership of wind generation by firms
that also own thermal plants leads to increased prices. However, when we estimate the size
of this effect, we find that it is small. Third, forcing the largest generator to sell part of its
power forward has positive effects in theory, but limited effects on equilibrium prices when
we simulate their effect for the SEM for reasonable levels of forward contracts. Fourth, in-
creasing demand response can lead to significantly lower prices, although it is difficult to
implement. We therefore conclude that regulators will have to remain vigilant and continue
monitoring bids, although the lack of transparency in the Target Model will increase the
market monitoring challenges.
In the next section we describe the state of the SEM, a competitive market, in 2011.
Section 3 discusses the role of wind generation, forward markets and price elasticity of demand
in the price formation of an oligopolistic market, using a simple two-firm setup. Section 4
introduces the simulations and section 5 discusses the results of the empirical analysis: the
change in wholesale prices that could occur with strategic bidding with and without the three
market power mitigation strategies.
2 The Single Electricity Market
The wholesale Single Electricity Market (SEM) of Ireland and Northern Ireland was estab-
lished in 2007. Both jurisdictions were previously served by vertically integrated state-owned
utilities. The SEM is a small market, serving a population of about 6.4 million in the 2011
reference year, with a large and increasing penetration of wind generation. Investors are free
to decide what type of generation to invest in, given existing market conditions, but bidding
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behaviour is strictly regulated through the Bidding Code of Practice (Market, 2007).
Under its current market design, the SEM is a mandatory pool system where genera-
tors bid their short-run marginal costs (fuel, carbon, operational and maintenance costs)
and receive the system marginal price in addition to capacity payments (Di Cosmo and
Malaguzzi Valeri, 2014). Capacity payments in the SEM are designed to cover the cost of
installing an additional unit of generation capacity. Plants bid in the day-ahead market and
are stacked according to their bids, from the cheapest to the most expensive. They are called
to generate in that order until they produce enough to service existing demand, accounting
for each plant’s technical constraints. The resulting electricity price does not take into ac-
count the transmission constraints or the capacity payments. The SEM operates within the
EU and is therefore subject to the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS).
The regulatory authorities monitor the market through the Market Monitoring Unit.
Power plants are required to bid their short run marginal cost in line with the bidding code
of practice, based on day-ahead spot prices and receive the System Marginal Price (SMP). In
addition to the SMP, which covers short-run costs of generation, generators receive capacity
payments, designed to cover the cost of an additional unit of installed capacity. The market
mimics perfect competition, as discussed in Market Monitoring Unit (2009) and Gorecki
(2013) and verified in section 5.1.
In 2011 the SEM had only one interconnector between Northern Ireland and Scotland
with a capacity of about 400 MW. Given the limited size of the interconnector, we do not
take it into account during the market simulations. The 2011 SEM can be classified as an
oligopoly with a competitive fringe. Two firms had a capacity share over 10%, as shown
in Table 1, with 3 firms generating more than 10% of demand (demand is calculated as
the sum of the generation of all the plants bidding into the market directly, interconnector
flows and the generation of smaller wind farms that do not).3 The largest firm is state-
owned ESB, followed by AES, which owns the largest thermal plants in Northern Ireland.4
Note that Bord Ga´is owns a single thermal plant in 2011. We would expect it to have no
advantage bidding strategically. However, we later show that its ownership of wind generation
pushes it to bid strategically, although the effect of its bidding behaviour is quite small on
3Generation of the smaller wind farms is estimated by the transmission system operators: EirGrid in the
Republic of Ireland and SONI in Northern Ireland.
4ESB is formed by ESB-PG, the incumbent in the Republic of Ireland, and ESB-International and we
consider it a single firm. In 2012 the regulators let ESB bid as an integrated firm since the Bidding Code of
Practice limited market power.
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total wholesale prices. Wind linked to companies only through Power Purchase Agreements
(PPAs) is excluded from the relevant company’s strategic portfolio and it is assumed to be
independent.
The SEM provides priority dispatch for a fixed amount of generation fuelled by peat.
Peat is an indigenous fuel in the Republic of Ireland, with a low energy content. To secure
this indigenous source, the government of Ireland guarantees a minimum yearly consumption
of peat by power plants.
In 2011, due to large investments in renewable generation and the lingering effects of the
financial crisis on electricity demand, the SEM displayed excess capacity, with a peak demand
of 6,533MW compared to total capacity of 10,930MW (EirGrid and SONI, 2011).
Table 1: Market share by capacity and generation in the Single Electricity Market, 2011.
Firm Capacity (MW) Capacity Share (%) Gen. share (%)
ESB 4166 38.1 43.7
AES 1830 16.7 11.0
Viridian 1011 9.3 12.4
Endesa 1016 9.3 0.2
Bord Ga´is 672 6.1 8.3
Fringe-Thermal 835 7.6 8.6
Fringe-Renewables 1400 12.8 10.8
Net Imports - - 5.1
Total 10,930 100 100
ESB includes ESB-PG and ESB-I.
Capacity and market shares include wind ownership.
Dublin Bay is included in ESB-I’s portfolio, as ESB-I owns 70% of its shares.
Datasources: SEMO, allislandproject.org, EirGrid, SONI, windpower.net.
In 2011 renewables (mostly wind) accounted for about 27% of total capacity, the sum of
the renewable fringe in Table 1 and wind included in large firms’ holdings. Table 2 shows
that renewables (the sum of wind and hydro) generated about 17% of total demand. As in
all EU countries, wind has priority dispatch.5 The marginal cost of wind generation is close
to zero, so when wind blows it is always profitable to generate. In practice, wind can be
considered a price taker, because of the operation of the pool that ranks lowest to highest
bidders. In section 3.1 we show, however, that wind can influence the bidding strategy of
firms that own both wind and dispatchable generation.
5EU directive 2009/28/EC.
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Table 2: Generation by fuel type and share of total demand, 2011
Fuel GWh Gen. share (%)
Natural Gas 19602 56.3%
Coal 5224 15.0%
Oil (incl. distillate) 185 0.5%
Peat 2079 6.0%
Hydro 693 2.0%
Wind 5259 15.1%
Other 98 0.3%
Net imports 1769 5.1%
Source: SEMO; EirGrid and SONI (wind); UKGrid (net imports)
3 Oligopolies and market power mitigation: a simple model
In this section we present a simplified two-generator model to highlight how generators’ be-
haviour and market mitigation measures will affect wholesale electricity prices. To model the
oligopolistic aspect of the market we use a Cournot framework, with a competitive fringe that
encompasses the increasing number of price takers on the market (including wind generators
and combined heat and power plants).
The assumption of Cournot competition, where firms bid the quantities of electricity they
will generate in each period, is a simplification. When there are capacity constraints and
demand is rationed efficiently, the Cournot outcome mimics a two step game where firms
choose capacity in stage one and compete in prices (a` la Bertrand) in stage two (Tirole,
1988). Some of the strong assumptions needed to obtain the Cournot equilibrium in the
two-part game are verified in the case of electricity markets: electricity is a non-differentiated
good, capacities are observable by all, capacity costs are relatively large and bids are set
simultaneously. This explains why the Cournot competition framework has often been used
to analyse outcomes in electricity markets, both in Europe and the US (see Wolfram, 1999,
Bushnell, 2007, Borenstein et al., 1999). In turn, we study the effect of changes in wind
generation ownership, forward contracts and price elasticity of demand.
3.1 Wind generation ownership
We first highlight the difference in prices in the competitive scenario versus the Cournot one
assuming that all wind generation is competitive. We then address the effect of accounting
for ownership of wind generation.
Assuming that all wind is competitive, Twomey and Neuhoff (2010) and Browne et al.
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(2015) show that in the short run increased wind generation decreases market power (and
therefore prices) in periods when wind blows heavily. On the other hand, it may increase
market power and prices at times of low wind. Long run effects depend on how returns to
investment for thermal plants evolve over time. Browne et al. (2015) suggest that if increased
wind leads to lower investment in thermal plants, especially in peaking units, in the long run
it may drive higher market power in periods when wind blows weakly. Here we focus not on
the effect of increased wind generation per se, but on the effect of wind ownership on the
price in an oilgpopoly setting.
We assume that there are 2 symmetric firms, each with total cost function Cj = q2j /2,
and increasing marginal costs (MC) cj = qj , ∀j. We also include fixed capital costs Fj in
firms’ profit functions. The firms face a (inverse) linear demand curve P = a− b ·Q for every
period, where P (0) > 0.
To simplify the analysis, we limit the competitive fringe to 0 marginal cost producers in
the following example. Such producers will offer generation on the market any time the price
is non-negative. The sum of all the price-taking output at time t is represented by QFt .
Each strategic firm j chooses the generation quantity in each period to maximise its
expected profits Πj .
max
qj
Πj = (a− b ·Q) · qj − q2j /2− Fj where Q =
∑
j
(qj) +QF (1)
The first order condition for each firm j yields the following equilibrium quantity:6
qj =
a− b ·QF
(1 + 3b) (2)
with corresponding Cournot equilibrium price:
PC = (1 + b)(a− b ·Q
F )
1 + 3b (3)
The larger the competitive fringe QFt , the lower the equilibrium price will be.
We can compare the price in Cournot to the price that would occur in perfect competition,
where P = MC. In equilibrium, the marginal cost is the same for both firms (MCi = MCj =
MC) and the equilibrium price will be equal to the common marginal cost, P (qi+qj +QF ) =
6The second order condition for a maximum is also met.
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MC, leading to:
P ∗ = a− b ·Q
F
1 + 2b (4)
PC is always larger than P ∗ as the difference between the two is greater than 0:
PC − P ∗ = (1 + b)(a− b ·Q
F )
1 + 3b −
a− b ·QF
1 + 2b =
2b2(a− b ·QF )
(1 + 3b)(1 + 2b) > 0 (5)
Equation 1 shows the profit maximization function of a firm operating as a Cournot com-
petitor in an environment that has a fringe of price-taking firms, including wind generators.
What happens when some of the wind is owned by firms that bid strategically? We assume
that the marginal cost of wind generation is 0, that both generators own wind and continue
assuming that the firms are symmetric, so that each strategic firm owns an equal amount of
wind generation, which we denote qw2 . The fringe generation is therefore QF = QF0 , where
QF0 is the amount of wind owned by independent generators, and wind generation is the sum
of QF0 and qw.
Each firm generates a quantity of electricity denoted by qj + q
w
2 . The profit maximizing
function for strategic firm 1 becomes the following:
max
q1
Π1 = [a− b · (q1 + q2 + qw +QF0 )] · (q1 +
qw
2 )− q
2
1/2− F1 (6)
and similarly for symmetric firm 2. Note that the firm cannot choose the amount of qw since
wind generation is not dispatchable. Also,when wind is available it will be optimal for the
firm to bid it in. This however does not exclude that wind ownership will affect the optimal
thermal quantity a generator bids into the market. Because any existing wind will benefit
from higher prices, there is an added incentive to owners of both wind and thermal generation
to decrease the quantity of dispatchable (thermal) generation offered in the market.
The first order condition (FOC) for maximisation is
q1 = q2 := qˆ =
a− b(32qw +QF0 )
1 + 3b (7)
As wind generation increases, strategic firms decrease the optimal amount of thermal gener-
ation.
Substituting the equilibrium amounts in the Cournot price function PC(qw) = a−b ·(q1+
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q2 + qw +QF )) yields:
PC(qw) = a− b · [2qˆ(qw) + qw +QF0 ] (8)
How does PC vary with quantity of wind owned by a strategic firm? Using comparative
statics, we can define the effect on the equilibrium price of a change in qw by differentiating
Equation 8 with respect to qw.
dPC
dqw
= −2b · dqˆ
dqw
− b = −b1 + 3b < 0 ∀b > 0. (9)
We compare this to the change in the equilibrium Cournot price when additional wind
is owned by independent generators, that is when QF0 increases. Differentiating equation 8
with respect to QF0 yields the following:
dPC
dQF0
= −b(1 + b)1 + 3b (10)
If we compare equation 9 to equation 10, we see that when wind is owned by strategic
firms the equilibrium price decreases less: |dPCdqw | < |dP
C
dQF0
|. This finding is consistent with
Ben-Moshe and Rubin (2015), who take a slightly different approach.
3.2 Forward contracts
How does the oligopoly equilibrium on the spot market change if the regulators force gen-
erators to sell some of their product forward? There is a broad literature that considers
forward markets as endogenous, allowing generators to yield market power both in the spot
and in the forward market (see e.g. Mahenc and Salanié, 2004, Green, 1999). In this paper we
focus on the case where regulators determine both price and quantity sold forward, thereby
eliminating the possibility of market power in the forward market. Regulating the price of
forward sales is a solution adopted in a few markets, mostly through virtual power plant
(VPP) auctions (see Ausubel and Cramton, 2010, Creti et al., 2012), although a few of these
auctions have been recently eliminated, e.g. the VPP auctions in Spain that ended in 2009
(Federico, 2010). In the SEM, whereas generators are free to sell forward a larger volume
than dictated by the regulators, in practice they do not.7
7One explanation for this behaviour is that the spot market is fully hedged, as all the costs are passed on
to final consumers, thereby providing limited incentives to trade forward. Other possible explanations are tied
to the small size of the market: there are fixed transaction costs associated with trading in forward markets
and in the SEM there may be a lack of interested buyers.
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de Frutos and Fabra (2012) show that the price of forward contracts makes no difference
on firms’ bidding behaviour in the spot market when forward contract prices are exogenous,
although it affects firms’ profits.
Assume that only one firm is forced to sell xi forward contracts, say firm 1, at price
τ1. In that case the objective function for firm 1 will become to maximise profits where the
equilibrium price is P ∗ and F is the amount of electricity sold forward:
max
q1
Π1 = P ∗ · (q1 + q
w
2 )− q
2
1/2− F1 + (τ1 − P ∗)x1 (11)
Forward contracts often take the form of contracts for differences, where the seller pays (or
is paid) the difference between the forward contract price and the spot price. The contracts
for difference can be thought of as strictly financial contracts. In any given period a firm
can sell more or less than the amount it generates, although in practice x1 will be smaller
than the firm’s competitive output. Remember that x1 is determined by the regulator and is
explicitly used to mitigate market power. The regulator will not force a firm to sell more than
its theoretical production. The amount sold forward is sold to the suppliers of final consumers
who continue to buy all of their electricity on the market at the spot price. Similarly, the
firm continues to sell all its electricity on the spot market. If the spot market price is larger
than τ1, generators will pay the difference between P ∗ and τ1 to consumers. Consumers will
pay the difference to generators if the spot market price is lower than τ1.
This can be rewritten as:
max
q1
Π1 = [a− b · (q1 + q2 + qw +QF0 )] · (q1 +
qw
2 − x1)− q
2
1/2− F1 + τ1x1 (12)
Since τ1 will not influence the spot market equilibrium, its level does not matter for this
analysis, although it will influence firms’ profits.
We are assuming that only firm 1 is subject to forward contracts. The Cournot equilibrium
quantity for firm 1 (subject to contracts) can be expressed as:
qˆ1 =
a− b(32qw +QF0 )
1 + 3b +
b(q + 2b)x1
(1 + b)(1 + 3b) (13)
Note that this is the same expression as in Equation 7, except that the equilibrium
quantity for Firm 1 increases with the amount of contracts sold forward x1.
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Calculating the equilibrium for Firm 2 and substituting in the expression for the equilib-
rium price gives the following expression:
Pˆ = a(1 + b)− bq
w − b(1 + b)QF0
1 + 3b −
2b3
(1 + b)(1 + 3b)x1 (14)
The main finding is that the Cournot equilibrium price decreases as the amount x1 sold
forward by firm 1 increases:
dPC
dx1
= − 2b
3
(1 + b)(1 + 3b) < 0 (15)
This intuition remains true with more complex representations of the interactions between
firms. Using supply function equilibria, de Frutos and Fabra (2012) conclude that in power
markets with one dominant player, forcing the largest player to sell some if its electricity
forward will always be pro-competitive in the spot market (i.e. the price will decrease) .8
In our simulations, we explore different levels of forward sales for the largest generator
and investigate how they affect the spot price.
3.3 Price elasticity of demand
Finally, we observe that when the sensitivity of electricity demanded to price increases, the
Cournot mark-up with respect to the competitive price decreases. Bushnell (2007) sum-
marises the literature to show that with symmetric firms, the price-cost margin (the Lerner
Index) is proportional to 1/, where  is the price elasticity of demand, p is the price, mc is
the marginal cost and n is the number of oligopolistic firms in the market.
p−mc
p
= 1
n
(16)
When the firms are not symmetric, the intuition stays the same. The more sensitive
demand is to changes in price, the lower the price-cost margin in equilibrium.
Our simulations suggest that increasing demand sensitivity to price provides clear benefits
in terms of limiting market power. We recognize that increasing demand sensitivity is not
easy. In general, retail prices tend to change infrequently, providing consumers no incentives
8If firms are similarly sized, forward contracts may help to maintain collusion in the spot market. Murphy
and Smeers (2010) shows that the pro-competitive effect may not arise if firms are capacity-constrained. Liski
and Montero (2006) and Ressner et al. (2010) show that with an infinite horizon, the pro-competitive effect
also disappears, although in their models the size of forward sales is chosen by the firms, not the regulator.
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to adjust consumption in the short run. Electricity market operators and regulators have tried
to increase the sensitivity of electricity demand to price, in part to control market power and
in part to enable integration of intermittent renewables. In the US, the attempt to include
demand resources in wholesale electricity markets was encouraged by FERC regulation 719,
although many of the demand response measures put in place are not price based, thereby
limiting the effect on price elasticity of demand (Bushnell et al., 2009).
Overviews of demand response measures in the US and Europe highlight the technical,
operational and economic challenges in moving towards a more responsive demand (O’Connell
et al., 2014, Torriti et al., 2010, Faruqui et al., 2015). Technical challenges include the need to
establish reliable control strategies (O’Connell et al., 2014). Operational challenges include
the difficulty moving away from fixed retail prices to time-varying prices, although this may
be easier for industrial consumption (Torriti et al., 2010). Many jurisdictions are trying
to increase demand response, in part with the goal of accommodating more intermittent
renewable generation. With this goal in mind, Lazar (2014) proposes a combination of
technological and market measures to increase demand response, such as improved demand
response markets, higher prices at times of high demand increases, inclusion of more storage
on the system and greater interconnection with neighboring systems.
4 Data
4.1 Demand and wind
The historical demand for 2011, net of interconnector flows, comes from EirGrid and SONI,
the transmission operators in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland respectively. In
the SEM, the yearly peak hours are from 5 p.m. to 7 p.m. in the winter, whereas during the
summer it is earlier, typically between noon and 2 p.m. Figure 1 shows demand in each hour
of the day, by day of the week, averaged across the full year. The SEM is fairly small, with
an average peak demand of around 4.5GW and a peak demand on cold December afternoons
of about 6.5GW.
Wind generation is estimated by EirGrid and SONI. The level of wind we use in these
simulations includes both wind that bids into the market and smaller wind farms.9 Average
hourly wind generation by day of week is correlated with the load, although peak wind
9In 2011, including the smaller wind farms increases reported wind generation by about 25% on average.
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generation is around 3 p.m., a few hours before the load peak. However, when we examine
the correlation between load and wind generation at the half-hourly level the correlation
disappears, with a coefficient equal to 0.14 in 2011.
(a) SEM average hourly loads, 2011, MW
(b) SEM average wind generation, 2011, MW
Data sources: SEMO, EirGrid and SONI
Figure 1: Average loads and wind in the SEM in 2011, MW
4.2 Price elasticity of demand
Demand for electricity responds to (retail) prices. We use sectoral estimates of the Price
Elasticity of Demand (PED) for Ireland from Di Cosmo and Hyland (2013). The estimates
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by sector are combined with the electricity consumption share by sector from the SEAI
National Energy Balances10 to estimate the average PED for electricity in Ireland. We
implicitly assume that numbers for Northern Ireland are similar. Table 3 shows an average
PED for electricity of e = −0.16, consistent with international estimates (see Table 1 in
Fan and Hyndman, 2011). This is an upper bound of the PED for wholesale prices, since
wholesale prices are a fraction of final retail prices. The implied wholesale PED, based on
wholesale’s share of retail prices for 2011 (as reported by Eurostat) is equal to e = −0.11. In
the simulation section we report the main results for e = −0.11 and a sensitivity analysis for
e = −0.16 and e = −0.30.
Table 3: Price Elasticity of Demand by Sector, Ireland.
Sector Consumption PED PED*Share Wholesale price Wholesale
share as a share of PED
retail price
Industrial 38% -0.275 -0.105 76% -0.080
Residential 33% -0.07 -0.023 55% -0.013
Commercial 26% -0.09 -0.024 55% -0.013
Agriculture 2% -0.38 -0.009 55% -0.005
Weighted PED -0.16 -0.11
Consumption share from SEAI National Energy Balances for 2011 (see footnote 10).
Elasticity by sector from Di Cosmo and Hyland (2013).
Wholesale price shares from Eurostat.
The lower values are in line with the hourly price elasticity of demand in the Ontario
(Canada) wholesale market (Genc, 2016). The author finds that the hourly price elasticity
of demand in the Ontario wholesale market is on average around 0.13 in absolute value and
is higher in the winter than in the summer.
4.3 Fuel prices
The fuel prices included in the simulation are historical 2011 spot market prices, used by
generators to build their bids. Gas prices are the same for the Republic of Ireland and
Northern Ireland as gas is imported from GB through a common interconnector. Given that
gas has a pronounced seasonality, we include different prices by quarter. Distillate oil prices
vary by month and Table 4 reports their quarterly average. All other fuels have a single
price over the year. Moneypoint, the coal plant in the Republic of Ireland, obtains a lower
10Available at http://www.seai.ie/Publications/Statistics-Publications/Energy-Balance/
Previous-Energy-Balances/
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price per tonne of coal than Kilroot, the coal plant in Northern Ireland. Moneypoint can
accommodate larger ships thanks to its deeper port, so we report the average price for the
two plants separately.
Table 4: Fuel prices, €/GJ, 2011
Gas Coal Peat Distillate
RoI NI
Q1:Jan-Mar 6.20 16.60
Q2:Apr-Jun 5.98 17.62
Q3:Jul-Sep 5.65 17.25
Q4:Oct-Dec 6.74 17.49
Average 6.14 3.94 4.47 3.75 17.24
5 Simulations
This section reports the change in wholesale electricity prices in the SEM when firms bid
strategically, in the presence of three conditions that may influence firms’ strategies: changes
in the ownership of wind farms, the existence of a compulsory forward market for the largest
firm and changes in demand response. It compares the prices to the perfectly competitive
price.
We use Energy Exemplar’s PLEXOS (version 7.3) Integrated Energy Model and the
Xpress Mixed Integer Programming solver11 to simulate SEM wholesale electricity prices for
2011. PLEXOS is a modelling tool used for electricity market modelling and planning. The
model optimises thermal and renewable generation and pumped storage subject to operational
and technical constraints at an hourly resolution. The objective function is to minimise total
costs over the year across the full system including: operational costs, consisting of fuel costs
and carbon costs; start-up costs consisting of a fuel offtake at start-up of a unit; and a fixed
unit start-up cost. A detailed description of the model and the model equations can be found
in Deane et al. (2014).
5.1 Perfect competition
We start by assuming that firms are price takers, i.e. they do not engage in strategic be-
haviour. Table 5 reports the simple average of the system marginal price (SMP). For com-
parison, we also include the historical average. The historical price is close to the simulated
11FICO Xpress Optimizer, available at http://www.fico.com
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perfectly competitive price, with the historical price about 3 per cent higher than the simu-
lated one and displaying a slightly lower variance. This confirms that the curent market is
close to perfectly competitive in line with expectations, since bidding in the SEM is currently
strictly regulated.
Table 5: Perfect competition short-run price, historical and simulated, 2011 €/MWh
Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Simulated Perfect Competition SMP 59.7 34.9 6.8 559.4
Historical SMP 61.8 32.5 0.0 487.5
The reported mean is the simple average.
Simulated values in italics.
The system marginal price (SMP) summarises the short run costs of generating electricity
and includes fuel, carbon and operation and maintenance costs. In addition generators receive
capacity payments, which were on average equal to e16.2/MWh in 2011 (Deane et al., 2015).
The sum of the SMP and capacity payments is a measure of the long-run costs of generating
electricity. Table 6 reports the long-run price as the sum of capacity payments and the short-
run values, weighted by demand. These numbers are slightly higher than those reported in
5 (where the price was not weighted by demand) since the price tends to be higher when
demand is larger.
Table 6: Perfect competition long-run price, historical and simulated, 2011 €/MWh
Price
Historical SMP, weighted avg. 65.0
Simulated SMP, weighted avg. 62.8
Capacity Payments 16.2
Historical Perfect Competition, long run 81.2
Simulated long-run perfect competition price 79.0
SEMO, EirGrid and SONI. Capacity payments from Deane (2015)
Reported averages are weighted by demand.
To investigate what happens when the regulator is unable to monitor bids closely, we
relax the assumption of perfect competition. We compare the prices that emerge when firms
bid strategically to the simulated long run marginal price of €79.0/MWh reported in the last
row of Table 6. Note that when we estimate the equilibrium price with strategic firms, we
do not add any capacity payments. In energy-only markets the price is designed to cover
both short and long run cost of generating electricity. The energy-only price will always be
larger than the short-run cost in the competitive scenario. The question we examine here is
how much larger the energy-only price is in the presence of both market power and measures
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that could affect market power: different wind ownership patterns, forward contracts and
increased demand response.
5.2 Cournot competition with varying wind ownership
In section 3.1 we showed that the distribution of wind ownership influences the strategic bids
of thermal plant owners. In this section we verify how large the effect on wholesale prices is
in response to variations in wind ownership.
We compare the wholesale price of electricity in 3 scenarios. In the first, all wind is
considered independent (i.e. is not associated with any thermal generator). In the second,
firms with more than one thermal plant are assumed to bid strategically and include their
wind holdings when setting their optimal bid. In the third scenario, all thermal plant owners
(including Bord Ga´is that owns a single thermal plant in 2011) bid strategically and include
wind holdings when setting their bid. Wind, hydro and biomass generators not owned by
one of the major firms are assumed to be price takers. Peat plants are also price takers since
they have priority dispatch in the SEM.
In 2011 about 62% of wind capacity was owned by independent operators. The remaining
38% belonged to companies that also owned thermal plants, as shown by Table 7. Wind
linked to companies only through PPAs is excluded from the relevant company’s strategic
portfolio and is assumed to be independent. The information on wind capacity ownership
comes from the Irish Wind Energy Association’s (IWEA) (www.iwea.com). We expect that
including wind ownership in thermal plants’ portfolio will increase the equilibrium price with
respect to the case when all wind is independent, in line with the modelling results in section
3.1.
Table 7: Wind ownership, 2011
Company Share (%)
Viridian 17
Bord Gais 12
ESB 9
Wind Indep. 62
Table 8 shows that when all wind is independent, the price in the Cournot equilibrium
increases to an average €129.1/MWh or 63% above the perfectly competitive price. This
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suggests that a sizeable amount of wind (around 15% of total demand) is not sufficient on its
own to bring prices close to their competitive levels, given the SEM’s market structure and
in the absence of additional measures.
When we include the effect of wind ownership on firms’ bids, the wholesale price increases
a little more, to €130.5/MWh. The direction of the change is as expected, but the size of
the change is not very large, in part because more than 60% of wind remains independent
in both scenarios. Note that there is no difference between the scenario where all wind is
independent and the one where all thermal plant owners other than Bord Ga´is account for
wind ownership when optimising bids, highlighting that the effect of wind ownership is quite
small in practice. The effect of wind ownership on Bord Ga´is’ bids is likely due to wind’s
large share of Bord Ga´is’ total capacity: wind increases Bord Ga´is’ capacity from 438MW
to 672MW, representing 35% of its capacity. We therefore conclude that increasing strategic
firms’ wind ownership up to 40% of available wind capacity does not significantly add to the
risk of high market power in the SEM.
Table 8: SMP, with and without strategic wind, 2011, €/MWh
Wholesale price % Difference LRPC
Long-run Perfect Competition (LRPC) 79.0 -
All wind independent 129.1 63
Historical wind ownership 130.5 65
Bord Ga´is wind independent 129.1 63
Averages are weighted by demand
5.3 Forward contracts
We compare how prices change when the regulators impose different levels of forward sales
on the dominant generator, ESB. We start by comparing the Cournot outcome without
forward contracts to the scenario where ESB sells about 10% of its generation forward. This
corresponds to the historical amount of forward contracts imposed by the regulator in 2011
and is equivalent to an average of about 307MW of forward contracts per hour. Table 9
shows the precie amount of generation we assume is sold forward in each scenario. Baseload
electricity is generated at any time of the day, midmerit is generated between 7:00 and 23:00
and peak is generated between 17:00 and 21:00 during the months of October to March, both
included.12 We build the 2GW and 3GW scenarios assuming a distribution between baseload,
12The regulators also distinguish between business and non-business days for midmerit forward contracts,
but we assume the same amount in all days of the week in the reported scenarios.
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midmerit and peak that is proportional to the 2011 historical one. We assume that the sum
of all contracts types is constant across quarters.13. We include a fixed contract price for all
forward contracts of €80/MWh, although note that changes in the contract price imposed
by the regulator will have no effect on the spot price since the price is exogenously set, as
discussed in section 3.2. The contract price will have an effect on the profits of firms that
sell forward, but that is not the focus of this paper. In each of these scenarios, only ESB is
selling forward. All other strategic generators bid strategically in the spot market with their
full capacity.
Table 9: ESB forward contract scenarios by quarter in MW
2011 historical 2GW 3GW
Quarter BL midmerit peak BL midmerit peak BL midmerit peak
Q1 0 155 202 0 868 1132 0 1303 1697
Q2 0 312 0 0 2000 0 0 3000 0
Q3 0 211 0 0 2000 0 0 3000 0
Q4 209 104 36 1198 596 206 1797 894 309
BL=baseload: 24 hours a day; midmerit from 7:00 to 23:00;
peak from 17:00 to 21:00 between October and March.
Table 10 shows that when ESB sells an amount of electricity forward similar to the 2011
historical amount, prices in the strategic scenario decrease only slightly (to €129.1/MWh)
with respect to the case with no forward contracts (€130.5). When the level of forward
contracts increases more than six fold, to 2GW on average per period, the spot price decreases
by €11, to €119.4/MW, still 51% above the long-run perfectly competitive price. Finally,
for the 3GW scenario (about a ten-fold increase from the historical level), the spot price
decreases to €106.4/MW, staying about 35% above the long-run perfectly competitive price.
Table 10: Simulated SMP, with and without forward contracts, 2011, €/MWh
Scenario Wholesale price % Difference LRPC
Long-run Perfect Competition (LRPC) 79.0 -
No forward sales 130.5 65
2011 Historical forward sales 129.1 63
2GW forward sales 119.4 51
3GW forward sales 106.4 35
Averages are weighted by demand
We conclude that the spot price goes in the expected direction when forward contracts are
imposed by the regulator. However, the effect of forward contracts on the largest generator
is not very large for realistic levels of forward contracts. Increasing the amount of contracts
13Historically quarter 3 had a lower forward contract amount
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more than six-fold (the 2GW scenario) decreases spot prices by €11/MWh, or less than
10%. Increasing the forward contracts more than ten-fold (representing close to all of ESB’s
generation) decreases prices by about 18%. On its own, therefore, this measure does not
eliminate the risk of abuse of market power. One explanation of this result is that as more
and more of the dominant’s firm generation is sold forward, other generators can influence
the equilibrium price, so the market never approaches the perfectly competitive outcome.
5.4 Demand response
The final set of scenarios explore the effect of increasing demand response on equilibrium
prices. We assume that the elasticity of demand varies between -0.11 and -0.3. In particular,
we focus our analysis on three elasticity scenarios: -0.11, -0.16 and -0.3.
Table 11 shows that increasing the price elasticity of demand from -0.11 to -0.16 decreases
the equilibrium price in a Cournot scenario by €20/MWh. A large increase of the price
elasticity of demand to -0.3 would lead to equilibrium wholesale prices that are only 10%
larger that the perfectly competitive outcome, even without enacting any other measures.
Table 11: SMP and demand response, 2011, €/MWh
Elasticity Wholesale price % Diff. wrt long-run PC
-0.11 130.5 65
-0.16 109.6 39
-0.3 86.6 10
All prices are weighted averages
The LRPC price assumes elasticity = -0.11
The theoretical improvements in the market with a more elastic demand are appealing and
several jurisdictions are increasing their efforts to improve demand response. Price elasticity
of demand may increase in the medium to long term, as distributed storage becomes cheaper
and time-of-use tariffs and smart meters become more widespread. However, as discussed
in section 3.3, there is evidence that inducing a more elastic demand in the short run is
challenging. Increasing the responsiveness of demand to hourly prices as a minimum involves
new infrastructure (smart meters) and more flexible retail prices.
6 Conclusions
This paper highlights the challenges associated with moving to a fully deregulated electricity
wholesale market. In many jurisdictions the generation sector is characterised by a limited
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number of large firms, enabling the emergence of market power and its associated high prices.
Electricity markets are at particular risk of abuse of market power since electricity is not easily
stored, entry is costly and demand is relatively inelastic.
This paper explores three measures that may influence market power in wholesale elec-
tricity power markets: changes in ownwership of wind generation, increases in the share of
electricity generation sold forward by the largest generator and increases in the price elastic-
ity of electricity demand. We find that greater wind ownership by thermal generators does
not affect prices strongly. While wind ownership by thermal plant owners increases wholesale
prices, in line with the theoretical findings, it does so by a small amount.
Increasing the amount of generation that the largest firm has to sell forward decreases
the wholesale spot price, as expected. However, we find that for reasonable levels of forward
contracts, the effect on spot prices is not very large. One explanation is that as the incentive to
bid strategically decreases for the largest firm, it increases for the other oligopolists. Finally,
increasing the price elasticity of demand has a large theoretical impact on wholesale prices.
It is the only measure that on its own brings prices close to their perfectly competitive level.
However we highlight that there are challenges to creating a more elastic demand, especially
in the short run. As a minimum, creating a more elastic demand involves the deployment of
smart meters and the adoption of time-varying retail prices.
There are reasons to think that the simulation results presented here should be considered
upper bounds on the price that would be realised in an oligopolistic SEM market. First of
all, our analysis is based on a static environment. In practice firms will consider dynamic
incentives when bidding. For example, firms might recognise that if prices increase, the risk of
regulatory intervention or new entry by firms may also increase. Second, the results reported
in Table 8 assume that imports are frozen at their historical level. The interconnection with
Great Britain doubled in 2012, with the commissioning of the East-West interconnector and
we expect that large increases in the SEM wholesale price would lead to somewhat larger
imports of electricity. On the other hand, 2011 was a year when the SEM displayed excess
capacity, due in part to the continuing effect of the financial crisis on electricity demand. As
demand recovers we can expect more periods when generating firms would be able to exercise
market power.
Overall, the analysis suggests that for a market as the SEM, there is a risk that decreasing
regulatory oversight will produce a significant increase in marginal wholesale prices. We
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conclude that regulators will have to continue monitoring bids in the market, which will be
more difficult due to its lack of transparency. They should also consider putting in place the
infrastructure and regulations needed to increase the price elasticity of wholesale electricity
demand.
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